Can’t blog … grading papers. But, to honor Lawrence Summers’ retirement from fair Harvard, here’s a musing from one year ago today:
Purely hypothetical case. All the names are made up. SInce it’s my thought experiment, I stipulate the facts. Of course, you are encouraged to disagree with me about what follows from those facts.
Consider an economist named Barry Winters. Barry is giving a talk at a conference about what can be done to attract more women to the study of math and science, and to keep them in the field long enough to become full professors. In his talk, Barry suggests as a possible hypothesis for the relatively low number of women in math and science careers that there may be innate biological factors that make males better at math and science than females. (Barry also relates an anecdote about his daughter naming her toy trucks as if they were dolls, but obviously, he means this anecdote to be illustrative rather than evidentiary.) Barry’s talk does not go over well with the rest of the participants in the conference.
Question: Is Barry just exercising academic freedom here?
I don’t think the answer here is an obvious yes. Here’s an additional fact to consider: Several scientific studies were presented at the conference before Barry’s talk. All these studies presented significant evidence against the claim of an innate difference between males and females that could account for the “science gap”.
Barry is free to state hypotheses — even unpopular hypotheses — that might account for a particular phenomenon. But, as a scientist, he is also responsible to take account of data relevant to his hypotheses. If the data weighs against his preferred hypothesis, intellectual honesty requires that he at least acknowledge this fact. Some would argue that it could even require that he abandon his hypothesis (since, y’know, science is supposed to be evidence-based whenever possible).
Add another fact to the hypothetical case. Let’s say one of the conference organizers notes to Barry that there is this large body of evidence that seems to undermine his hypothesis. In reply, Barry says, “Well, I don’t believe any of those studies.” Is Barry within his rights to not believe these studies? Sure. But, he has a responsibility to explain why he rejects them. As a part of a scientific community, he can’t just reject a piece of scientific knowledge out of hand. Doing so comes awfully close to undermining the process of communication that scientific knowledge is based upon. You aren’t supposed to reject a study because you have more prestige than the authors of the study (so, you don’t have to care what thay say). You can question the experimental design, you can question the data analysis, you can challenge the conclusions drawn, but you have to be able to articulate the precise objection. Surely, rejecting a study just because it doesn’t fit with your preferred hypothesis is NOT an intellectually honest move.
So, as Barry has conducted himself here, he hasn’t been a responsible scientist. But the problem goes beyond a lack of intellectual honesty within the universe of scientific discourse. Barry will also be responsible for the bad consequences that flow from his remark.
No, it’s not what you think I’m going to say. The bad consequence I have in mind here is the mistaken view of science and its workings that Barry’s conduct conveys. Especially if Barry falls back on a plain vanilla “academic freedom” defense here, he conveys to the public at large the idea that any hypothesis in science is as good as any other. Scientists who are conscious of the evidence-based nature of their field will see the absurdity of this idea — some hypotheses are better, others worse, and whenever possible we turn to the evidence to make these discriminations. Barry compounds ignorance of the relevant data with what is essentially a statement that he doesn’t care what the data show. Either the public at large will assume he’s within his scientific rights to decide which data to care about without giving any justification for this choice (does he not care about these studies because the researchers are women?), or they will infer that data has little bearing on the scientific picture of the world (hell-o Foucault!). And clearly, such a picture of science will undermine the standing of the rest of the bits of knowledge scientists far more intellectually honest than Barry produce.
So, not only does Barry have some responsibilities that seem to have escaped him, but the rest of the scientists (whether at the conference or elsewhere) have a collective responsibility to put some kind of smackdown on Barry in order to address the mistaken picture of science his conduct conveys to society at large.
Of course, maybe you’d like to offer an alternative analysis?
Not to belabor an obvious point, but Barry isn’t a scientist. I’d be tempted to argue that after so many years in politics, he isn’t even a social scientist, but that might be too harsh.
However, it was a righteous smackdown, and well deserved. I’ve been admiring Sean Carroll’s blog entries on this since the events in question occurred. He said the things I wish I’d been smart enough to say at the time.
I try to remain open minded about the status of economics as a science. (I’m totally convinced that it’s dismal.)
It must be noted that economists present themselves to the public as scientists. If they really aren’t — and if so presenting themselves is giving the public the wrong ideas about science and its rules of play — then the “real” scientists ought to be calling shenanigans.
There is, after all, a price for being too nice.
Just sort of a more general problem for Barry: if you come to a conference with your slides all made up, and the preceding talks scoop you and/or contradict you, I imagine it can be hard to recover. That only works if you’ve never heard a dissenting view before, of course.
I’m not sure I can see the philosophical difference between most work in economics and the work done in many other sciences. As an economist, my day job is to formualte a falsifiable proposition, (New drug is cost-effective when compared with Old drug) collect empirical evidence (cost and efficacy data for New and Old drugs), test, and report findings (with appropriate caveats). That sounds like most other sciences to me, and is probably how the vast majority of the world’s economic work get’s done. The big theoretical ideas are what makes the news, but the graft is put in by people who follow the same process as other scientists.
Well, drowned, I have to admit, that doesn’t sound too much like science to me. All (Popperian) science may consist of falsifiable propositions (a problematic claim in and of itself) but not all falsifiable tests are science. It seems to me that science ought to add to our understanding of the natural world.
However, I was being a bit snide and churlish toward the dearly departed Dr. Summers, and am not trying to start a war between scientists and social scientists. For what it’s worth, understanding social phenomena is much harder than understanding the natural world, IMHO. And we really don’t understand the natural world either.
Please don’t be offended, because I surely mean no offense. The “dismalness” of economics not withstanding, you surely get paid much better than any scientist! And Barry, of course, was so far from the daily work of science (social or otherwise) that I don’t think he meaningfully represents it (or economics, for that matter).
No offense taken. I still maintain that the process is similar, though it is a fair distinction between understanding the natural world and the social phenomena to which you refer. I think economics crosses that boundary more than some of the other social sciences (thinking of John Maynard Smith and the application of game theory to evolution).
As for getting paid better, well, unfortunately the only satisfaction I get from being an economist in relation to my pay is that I understand the market forces which have led to it being what it is. But that’s the public/academic sector I suppose.