Psychohazard.

The other day, while surfing the web, my better half came upon this semi-official looking symbol for psychohazards:

psychohazard2.png

The verbiage underneath the symbol seem to indicate conditions that might have serious consequences for one’s picture of the world and its contents, or for one’s ability to come to knowledge about the world. A philosopher who was so inclined could go to town on this.
However, while this particular icon was new to me, this isn’t the first time I’ve seen the term “psychohazard” in use.

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You want a post *and* comments??

And really, why wouldn’t you? What could have prepared you for the possibility that reading one would make the other vanish, as if there were some kind of blogular wavefunction collapse?
The ScienceBlogs powers that be have been alerted that there’s an issue with disappearing comments (if you’re reading a post) and disappearing posts (if you’re reading the comments). They are busy trying to get the squirrels out of the ductwork (or fix the javascript problem, whichever).
In the meantime, if you’re desperate to contribute a comment to a post, or to get the 411 on a post on this blog that has up and vanished, shoot me an email and I’ll do what I can to help.

Is multitasking unethical?

In a recent column at Business Week, Bruce Weinstein (aka “The Ethics Guy”) argues that multitasking is unethical. He writes of his own technologically assisted slide into doing too many tasks at once:

I noticed that the more things I could do with ease on my computer, the harder it was to focus on any one activity. My natural inclination to jump from one thing to another prematurely was now aided and abetted by technology–the very thing that was supposed to be helping me. Then, after the PDA and cell phone became a part of my daily life, I found myself, like millions of others, faced with even more interruptions, and it became increasingly difficult to concentrate. The technological advances that once seemed so liberating had become oppressive.
I came to realize that multitasking isn’t something to be proud of. In fact, it’s unethical, and good managers won’t do it themselves and will not require it of those they manage.
Here’s why multitasking is unethical.
When you multitask, you’re doing a lot of work, but you’re not doing most (or any) of it well. A new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences revealed that people who fired off e-mails while talking on the phone and watching YouTube videos did each activity less well than those who focused on one thing at a time. Psychiatrist Edward M. Hallowell, author of CrazyBusy: Overstretched, Overbooked, and About to Snap! (Ballantine, 2006), puts it this way: “Multitasking is shifting focus from one task to another in rapid succession. It gives the illusion that we’re simultaneously tasking, but we’re really not. It’s like playing tennis with three balls.”

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Great moments in parent-teacher relations: back to school edition.

Dr. Free-Ride’s better half went to the Free-Ride offspring’s school for Back to School Night earlier this week. (I stayed at home with the sprogs to oversee dinner and baths.)
Dr. Free-Ride’s better half reported back that the younger Free-Ride offspring’s third grade teacher “doesn’t believe in too much homework”. (“She doesn’t believe it’s possible to assign too much homework?” I asked cautiously. “No, she doesn’t believe an excess of homework is a good thing,” my better half replied.)
And, she supported her stance with a page she distributed to parents summarizing recent educational research on the question of homework and student achievement.
I think we’re going to like this teacher.

Legal and scientific burdens of proof, and scientific discourse as public controversy: more thoughts on Chandok v. Klessig.

As promised, I’ve been thinking about the details of Chandok v. Klessig. To recap, we have a case where a postdoc (Meena Chandok) generated some exciting scientific findings. She and her supervisor (Daniel F. Klessig), along with some coworkers, published those findings. Then, in the fullness of time, after others working with Klessig tried to reproduce those findings on the way to extending the work, Klessig decided that the results were not sufficiently reproducible.
At that point, Klessig decided that the published papers reported those findings needed to be retracted. Retracting a paper, as we’ve had occasion to discuss before, communicates something about the results (namely that the authors cannot stand behind them anymore). By extension, a retraction can also communicate something to the scientific community about the researcher responsible for generating those results — perhaps that she was too quick to decide a result was robust and rush it into print, or that she made an honest mistake that was not discovered until after the paper was published, or that her coauthors no longer trust that her scientific reports are reliable.
The issue is complicated, I think, by the fact that there were coauthors on the papers in question. Coauthors share the labor of doing the scientific work, and they share the credit for the findings described in their paper. You might expect, therefore, that they would share responsibility for quality control on the scientific work, and for making sure that the findings are robust before the manuscript goes off to the journal. (In my first post on this case, I noted that “before the work was submitted to Cell, Klessig had one of his doctoral students try to verify it, and this attempt was at least good enough not to put the brakes on the manuscript submission.” However, given that further efforts to reproduce the findings seem not to have succeeded, I suspect opinions will vary on whether this pre-submission replication was enough quality control on the authors’ parts.) And, you might expect that it would be the rare case where a problem with a published manuscript would come to rest on the shoulders of a single author in the group.
If credit is shared, why isn’t blame?
Whatever you think ought to be the standard assumptions when a collaborative piece of scientific work does not hold up, in this particular case the blame seemed to fall on Chandok. She took issue with the implication of the retractions (among other communications) that she was unreliable as a scientific researcher. Probably she considered the importance of trust and accountability in the scientific community, recognizing that if she were not trusted by her fellow scientists and if her work were viewed as presumptively unreliable, she would not have much of a scientific career ahead of her. So, she sought legal remedy for this harm to her scientific reputation and career prospects by pursuing a defamation claim against Klessig.
There are separable issues at play here. One is the question of what is required in the eyes of the law to prove a claim of defamation. Another is what would constitute “best practices” for scientific work, both in terms of dealing with data and conclusions, and in terms of dealing with the scientists who generate the data and conclusions (and who are the main audience for the findings reported by other scientists). Here, I think “dealing with” encompasses more than simply classifying fellow scientists by whether or not you can trust their scientific output. It includes interactions with collaborators (and competitors) , not to mention interactions in scientific training relationships.
We might quibble about where a postdoc falls in the process of scientific training and development. Nevertheless, if the PI supervising a postdoc is supposed to be teaching her something (rather than just using her as another pair of hands, however well trained, in the lab), he may have specific responsibilities to mentor her and help her get established as a PI herself. Sorting out what those responsibilities are — and what other responsibilities could trump them — might be useful in preventing this kind of acrimonious outcome in other cases.
We’ll return to considering the broader lessons we might draw from this situation, but first let’s continue laying out the facts of Chandok v. Klessig, 5:05-cv-01076. (Again, I’m indebted to the reader who helpfully sent me the PDF of District Judge Joseph M. Hood’s ruling in this case, which is what I’m quoting below.)

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To those who think it’s appropriate to post non-specific death threats in comments on Friday Sprog Blogs.

First off, I moderate all my comments. Mostly it’s to eliminate comment spam, but it also means the rare death threat is not going to post without me approving it.
Second of all, why would you think you have the evidential basis to discern the religious convictions (or lack thereof) of either this blogger or her offspring? Even if you did, why would that be germane to a discussion of a classroom snake? And why, in any case, would it make you feel justified in asserting “you have forfeit your life”?
Obviously, you feel like you have an important message to convey to someone. I would like to suggest that I am not the right audience for that message (and that the readers of the Friday Sprog Blogging feature probably aren’t, either). And, I’m disinclined to let you hijack my soapbox to convey it.
You may have better luck getting your message out by way of a blog of your very own. You can get one for free from Blogger and WordPress.

Friday Sprog Blogging: classroom snake.

This school year, the elder Free-Ride offspring has a classroom teacher who used to be one of the elementary school’s science teachers. (Owing to budget cuts, both the science teachers have “retreated” to be general purpose classroom teachers, and all the classroom teachers have to teach their own science lessons.)
I’m happy about this because it means the science instruction the elder Free-Ride offspring gets in the classroom is going to be good. The elder Free-Ride offspring is happy about this because it means there’s a snake in the classroom.

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Do these claims look defamatory to you?

You may remember my post from last week involving a case where a postdoc sued her former boss for defamation when he retracted a couple of papers they coauthored together. After that post went up, a reader helpfully hooked me up with a PDF of District Judge Joseph M. Hood’s ruling on the case (Chandok v. Klessig, 5:05-cv-01076). There is a lot of interesting stuff here, and I’m working on a longer examination of the judge’s reasoning in the ruling. But, in the interim, I thought you might be interested in the statements made by the defendant in the case, Dr. Daniel F. Klessig, that the plaintiff in the case, Dr. Meena Chandok, alleged were defamatory.
In the longer post I’m working on, I’ll dig in to Judge Hood’s arguments with respect to what elements a plaintiff must establish to prove defamation, and what particular features of the scientific arena were germane to his ruling in this case. For the time being, however, I’m interested to hear what you all think about whether the 23 allegedly defamatory claims quoted below tend “to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace.” (13) As well, given that one element of defamation is that the defamatory statements are factually false, I’d like to hear your thoughts on the evidentiary standard a scientist should have to meet before making claims like these to other scientists.
Here, quoted from the ruling, are the 23 allegedly defamatory statements:

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